The Internet Can Be Made Safer by Using a Cognitive Approach to Cyber Defense and by Creating and Testing a Prototype.
Keywords:
Cybersecurity games, attack–defense decision making, financial incentives in cybersecurity, monetary penalties, human–Nash equilibrium comparison, Markov security games, network patching effectiveness, cognitive modeling, Instance-Based Learning (IBL) theory, human factors in cybersecurity, adversarial behavior analysisAbstract
Cyberattacks targeting digital infrastructure are escalating, highlighting the need to understand how financial incentives, technical limitations, and environmental information influence attacker and defender behavior. This thesis investigated these factors through a combination of controlled behavioral experiments and computational cognitive modeling. Across three studies examining financial incentives, results consistently showed that monetary rewards affected participant strategies in unexpected ways. Rather than promoting active engagement, financial rewards led participants to reduce both offensive and defensive actions, indicating a shift toward risk-averse behavior in cyber games.


